The optimistic meta-induction and ontological continuity

the case of the electron

Robert Nola

pp. 159-202

in: Lena Soler, Howard Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds), Rethinking scientific change and theory comparison, Berlin, Springer, 2008

Abstract

The pessimistic meta-induction attempts to make a case for the lack of ontological continuity with theory change; in contrast, its rival the optimistic meta-induction makes a case for considerable ontological continuity. The optimistic meta-induction is argued for in the case of the origin, and continuity, of our talk of electrons (even though the term "electron" was not initially used). The case is made by setting the history of identifying reference to electrons in the context of a generalised version of Russell's theory of descriptions, Ramsey's theory of theoretical terms and a development of these ideas by David Lewis.

Cited authors

Russell Bertrand

Lewis David