The origins and significance of Clark L. Hull's theory of value

John A. Mills

pp. 335-345

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

Hull's theory of value is interpreted as an example of the operation of Habermas' system of purposive-rational action. Habermas claims that the system has deeply penetrated the personal and private domains in advanced industrial societies. The author shows that, from the 1890s to the 1920s, American social scientists such as John Dewey created versions of positivism and instrumentalism that precisely fitted the demand that the social sciences should contribute to the material well-being and efficiency of American society. Clark L. Hull is a good test case for the scope and discriminating power of Habermas' theory. By the time that Hull began formulating his theory American social science had become mature. Nevertheless, it continued to operate within the constraints of the purposive-rational system. An aspect of the operation of the system is the provision of a seemingly objective justification for its practices. Hull attempted to provide such a justification and to extend his theory to every aspect of human life, including the sphere of values. The author goes on to assert that Clark L. Hull's theory of value was not deduced from his positivist theory of science but that his theory of science and his moral theory sprang from the same source. Such an analysis suggests that neo-behaviorist theories in general should be assessed not in terms of some supposedly objective, universal standards of truth and rationality, but in terms of their social function at the time of their creation.

Cited authors

Dewey John

Habermas Jürgen

Hull Clark L.