Identifying the properties of linguistically expressed experience

empirical induction or intuition of essences?

Wild

Don Schopflocher

Donald Kuiken

pp. 177-183

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

The identification of properties of linguistically expressed experience depends on (1) prior epistemological goals and (2) prior theoretical concepts. In the empirical-inductivist mode of protocol analysis, the goal is to provide a causal-explanatory account of mental processes. Newell and Simon (1972) thus interpret protocols with respect to a highly constrained domain of properties (knowledge and knowledge operations) and ascribe causal status to sequences of experiential properties. In the phenomenological-intuitionist mode of protocol analysis, the goal is to provide an essential description of experience as it is phenomenally "given" to the experiencer. Giorgi (1985) thus interprets protocols with respect to their psychological significance, and does not ascribe causal status to sequences of experiential propeties. Despite these differences, both modes of analysis provide general descriptions of types of experience, based upon a review of the properties of instances.