What distinguishes lay persons' psychological explanations from those of psychologists?

Stam

pp. 97-106

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

An examination of the impact of psychology on culture leads to the not-so-startling conclusion that psychological explanations have fared badly when compared to ordinary language explanations of psychological events. I review a number of arguments proffered by psychologists that attempt to account for this failure of scientific discourse to change people's self understandings. Then I address the nature of psychological explanations and contrast these to lay explanations of human action and argue that psychology must retain the mental as its elemental data. In doing so, however, we are still faced with the need for constructing a framework within which to couch psychological explanations. Here I argue that psychological explanations for human action cannot be reductive and must acknowledge that mental events are embedded in the discursive practices of a human community that shares linguistic and cultural practices.