Do mental events exist?

Fred Vollmer

pp. 85-96

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

We think we have beliefs, desires, thoughts, and intentions, and that such states and events determine what we do. We are wrong, says Churchland. All we have are brains, and processes and states in our brain determine our behavior. Churchland claims, however, that if we learned to respond to our sensations with concepts from modern physics and neurophysiology, our perception of ourselves (and the world) would change radically and become more true. Instead of experiencing colors and pains, we would see electromagnetic waves and feel the firing of neurons. It is argued that this position is highly implausible, both on conceptual and empirical grounds, and that, though all observation may be theory dependent, there are limits to how the raw material of sensation can be perceptually organized.