The myth of mind and the mistake of psychology

John Shotter

pp. 63-70

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

In psychology, it is thought "natural" to speak of people as possessing within themselves something called their "mind", and to think that minds have their own discoverable, intrinsic principles of operation, which owe nothing either to society or to history for their nature. But the "mind" as such is, I think, a mythic entity. And attention to it diverts our attention away from the detailed social processes involved, not only in negotiating the making of common meanings, but also from those involved in the everyday methods of testing and checking we use in establishing socially intelligible and legitimate common goals. It is its failure to notice the importance of these processes of normative evaluation which is, I think, psychology's mistake. What I want to claim below is: 1) that psychology is not a natural but a moral science, 2) that instead of what might be called a theoretical/explanatory approach, aimed at producing theoretical knowledge, it must use a practical/descriptive approach, aimed at gaining practical-moral knowledge, 3) that this aim is much more difficult to achieve than might be imagined, as more than simply academic activities are involved, and 4) that although 'social constructionist" studies are required at present, our embodied nature is what is our ultimate problematic.