On Kant and the refutation of subjectivism
pp. 208-217
in: Lewis White Beck (ed), Kant's theory of knowledge, Berlin, Springer, 1974Abstract
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that he provided refutations of the subjectivist, "idealist," or skeptical positions developed by such predecessors as Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume. Despite Kant's efforts, however, these positions have remained quite influential into the present century. Recently some valuable new commentaries on the first Critique have encouraged reconsideration of Kant's defense of realism.1 Typically, the authors of these commentaries attempt to derive from the text of the Transcendental Analytic a system of argumentation that genuinely reflects Kant's procedure, and at the same time can claim the attention (perhaps the conviction) of contemporary epistemologists. Different writers, of course, show different degrees of concern with the historical soundness of their interpretations or "reconstructions".
