Non-contextual self

Husserl and Nishida on the primal mode of the self

Shigeru Taguchi

pp. 31-46

in: Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa, Richard Stone (eds), The realizations of the self, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018

Abstract

It is obvious that in my experience, I cannot leave my own experience. Given that, how can I know that there are other perspectives than mine? In the present paper, I first approach this problem from the standpoint of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl seems to answer the question by his reflection on the "primal I" (Ur-Ich). I will analyze this strange but thought-provoking concept by interpreting it as a kind of "non-contextual self." Second, I will compare the result of this consideration with the concept of "pure experience" and "basho" (place) proposed by Kitaro Nishida. I try to show that these seemingly bizarre ideas of non-individual self might be necessary for our understanding of self and others. Individuals can only appear in a certain context, whereas there is a sort of experience that does not fit in any context.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Nishida Kitarô