Introduction

1-12

Husserl's phenomenological method

Stewart J. McKellar

17-31

The intentionality of logical significance and material ontological meaning

32-43

The intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness

44-54

The intentionality of transcendentally pure consciousness

55-77

Heidegger's concept of phenomenology

82-102

The phenomenological inquiry into the being of intentionality

103-121

Being in the world manifests Dasein's original transcendence

122-145

The temporal meaning of transcendence

146-161

The phenomenological method

reflective or hermeneutical?

167-188

Intentionality

an original or derived phenomenon?

Frederick Kersten

189-214

Gadamer's assessment of the controversy between Husserl and Heidegger

220-230

Ricoeur's attempted rapprochement between phenomenology and hermeneutics

231-238

Mohanty's account of the complementarity of descriptive and interpretive phenomenology

239-245

Crowell's account of Husserl's and Heidegger's divergent interpretations of phenomenology's transcendental character

246-250

Landgrebe's critique of Husserl's theory of phenomenological reflection

251-264