The dissonant origins of analytic philosophy

common sense in philosophical methodology

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

pp. 69-102

in: Sandra Lapointe, Christopher Pincock (eds), Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

Abstract

G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell are widely regarded as two of the founding figures in analytic philosophy. In this paper, we describe a tension between the Moorean and the Russellian conceptions of analysis, leading to two quite distinct approaches to philosophical methodology. Moore represents what could be described as an epistemically conservative conception of analysis, which accords default legitimacy to common sense beliefs. Russell represents a conception of analysis where there is more room for revision and transformation of common sense beliefs. We claim that this tension is intensified in the Carnap-Strawson debate in the 1960s and continues to run through the history of analytic philosophy all the way up to present times. This explains (in part) the variety of approaches in current analytic philosophy.

Cited authors

Russell Bertrand