Ceteris paribus conditions and the interventionist account of causality

Tobias Henschen

pp. 3297-3311

in: Albert Sole, Carl Hoefer (eds), Space-time and the wave function, Synthese 192 (10), 2015.

Abstract

The paper uses a de-relativized (or objectified) variant of Woodward’s definition of direct type-level causation to develop an account of causal ceteris paribus (cp) laws. It argues that the relation between X and Y needs to satisfy three conditions in order to qualify as one of direct type-level causation, that satisfaction of these conditions guarantees the applicability of claims of direct type-level causation, that the context of applicability motivates referring to these conditions as cp conditions, and that claims of direct type-level causation qualify as laws if they are explanatorily deep. The account of causal cp laws defended by the paper derives from a de-relativized variant of Woodward’s definition of direct type-level causation but can be shown not to conflict with Woodward’s thesis that there is no such thing as a cp law.