Psychose et restructuration du corps vécu

l'analyse de Blankenburg et Pankow à la lumière du transcendantal

Santiago Zúñiga

pp. 194-211

in: AUC Interpretationes 6, 2016.

Abstract

From a usual perspective, nothing seems to be more appealing than taking self-identity for granted. On the other hand, within the frame of transcendental philosophy, namely from a Fichtean standpoint, it is plausible to state that self-identity is nothing but obvious.That being said, if self-identity however appears to be a necessity for any subjective experience, such necessity remains circumscribed into what actually makes it possible as a self. Concerning this precise matter, Fichte has proved to be a great source of enlightenment, because he structured his whole philosophy (Wissenschaftslehere) in full accordance with the reflection of the I that shall (soll) posit itself as a founding act. This series of questions, however inscribed in the specific context of transcendental idealism, has a considerable impact on the field of phenomenological psychopathology. This was the case for the psychiatrist Wolfgang Blankenburg, who actually dealt with what he called a problematic distance, between an empirical and a transcendental I that is not able to accompany every representation.Subsequently, taking all these previous aspects into consideration, our paper aims to underline the importance of mobilizing a theory that allows for an insight into the dialectic of the patient’s activity, when it comes to accompanying the positing of a fundamental differentiation between the I and not-I, (according to the psychiatrist Gisella Pankow in L’homme et sa psychose), which ultimately will lead the patient to the recognition of his own world.

Cited authors

Fichte Johann Gottlieb

Blankenburg Wolfgang

Pankow Gisella