Preliminary observations on the history and theory of psychology from a structuralist point of view
pp. 207-236
in: Hans van Rappard, Pieter van Strien, Leendert Mos, William J. Baker (eds), Annals of theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1993Abstract
The paper explores the possibility of applying the structuralist view of scientific theories, elaborated by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller, to the history of psychology. By means of three examples, which will be interpreted from this point of view, it is shown that doing history can contribute to theoretical psychology. The first example discussed is the problem of the relationship between external and internal factors in the development of psychology. It is argued that Ebbinghaus' distinction between Past and History of psychology is based on the conviction that for the progress of the discipline the internal logic of psychology is more important than organizational circumstances like the foundation of a laboratory or a journal.The second example concerns the problem of verification and falsification of psychological theories. Using Freud's model of personality it is shown that supporting a theory, despite the falsification of its empirical hypotheses cannot be qualified as irrational behavior, but rather as normal in the history of science. A psychological theory (like any other scientific theory) can neither be falsified nor verified. It is an instrument for launching empirical hypotheses, and only they are subject to empirical testing.The third example deals with the equality, respectively inequality of experimental data and theoretical conclusions. It is demonstrated on the basis of Estes' theory of learning that the theory cannot be accused of the inequality between experimental learning curves and theoretically derived ones. An inequality means only that the critical learning process must be excluded from the sphere of application of the theory, or that the corresponding empirical hypothesis must be formulated in another way.
