Toward a new understanding of scientific change
applying interfield theory to the history of psychology
pp. 87-123
in: Hans van Rappard, Pieter van Strien, Leendert Mos, William J. Baker (eds), Annals of theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1993Abstract
In the 1960's positivist accounts of scientific explanation relied on axiomatization, justification, and deductive reconstructions. Since the 1970's, postpositivist philosophy of science has rejected axiomatization, replaced justification with discoveiy, posited incommensurable paradigms instead of deductive explanations, and made history the source of scientific rationality. During the 1980's, interfield theoiy showed promise as a way for philosophy of science to make closer contact with scientific problem areas.The particular promise of interfield theory is its metatheoretical attempt to integrate disciplines by recourse to the problems of scientists themselves. Scientists have solved problems by answering questions that cannot be answered within one field, by calling attention to neglected fields, and by predicting phenomena in other fields. Interfield science provides a metatheory of four ways to understand scientific change. An interfield case study illustrates the actual growth of theoretical coherence through historical problemsolving in psychology.