Strong determinism vs. computability

Cristian Calude

Douglas Campbell

Karl Svozil

Doru Ştefănescu

pp. 115-131

in: Werner Depauli Schimanovich, Eckehart Köhler, Friedrich Stadler (eds), The foundational debate, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

Penrose [40] (see also [41]) has discussed a new point of view concerning the nature of physics that might underline conscious thought processes. He has argued that it might be the case that some physical laws are not computable, i.e. they cannot be properly simulated by computer; such laws can most probably arise on the "no-man's-land" between classical and quantum physics. Furthermore, conscious thinking is a non-algorithmic activity. He is opposing both strong AI (according to which the brain's action, and, consequently, conscious perceptions and intelligence, are manifestations of computer computations, Minsky [35, 36]), and Searle's [47] contrary viewpoint (although computation does not in itself evoke consciousness, a computer might nevertheless simulate the action of a brain mainly due to the fact that the human brain is a physical system behaving according to (computable) mathematical "laws").