The problem of judgment in Husserl's later thought
pp. 129-152
in: , Philosophical logic, Berlin, Springer, 1967Abstract
During the last period of his thought Husserl undertook to develop a distinctive type of philosophical analysis of logic. This analysis, prescribed in its basic form by the general program of transcendental phenomenology, is pursued under the title "transcendental logic" and focuses especially upon the problem of the origin of the predicative judgment. In speaking of a problem of origin Husserl distinguishes his inquiry from a purely formal theory of judgment and indicates from the outset that judgment is to be interrogated within the compass of its concrete relation to that which is judged. His detailed analyses seek to establish the precise manner in which judging activity presupposes a pre-given object in relation to which judgment arises and in the determination of which the act of judgment is carried through. The domain within which such pre-given objects are presented Husserl calls pre-predicative experience, and it is this which the elucidation of the origin of judgment must take as its first theme.
