
Publication details
Year: 2013
Pages: 3377-3395
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Variations on a montagovian theme", Synthese 190 (16), 2013, pp. 3377-3395.
Abstract
What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates.
Publication details
Year: 2013
Pages: 3377-3395
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Variations on a montagovian theme", Synthese 190 (16), 2013, pp. 3377-3395.