Towards a post-humanist theory of value

pp. 139-160

in: Mark Rowlands, Jo Campling, The environmental crisis, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000

Abstract

If the arguments of the preceding chapters are correct, then we have a way of dismantling the mind-world dichotomy by pulling the mind into the world. In contrast to the overworked humanist-idealist tradition, we now have a way of understanding the mind as environmentally constituted; as not just connected to the environment but composed of it. We have a way of understanding ourselves as genuine beings-in-theworld.And, thus, we have, potentially, an axiological framework that does not necessarily doom the environment to secondary and derivative status. But how, exactly, do we move from an environmentalist theory of cognition to a genuinely environmentalist theory of value? How do we move from a conception of ourselves as genuine beings-in-the-world to a post-humanist conception of value in the world? This chapter aims to trace, in a way that is, admittedly, impressionistic and suggestive rather than detailed and complete, the logical contours of this move.