Subjectivist theories of intrinsic value

pp. 51-73

in: Mark Rowlands, Jo Campling, The environmental crisis, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000

Abstract

It was argued, provisionally, that in order to fulfil the function required of it, namely underwriting an environment based, as opposed to a human or sentient based, ethic, the concept of intrinsic value needed to incorporate two features. Firstly, intrinsic value needs to be non-instrumental in the sense that it does not derive from, and depend for its existence on, the goals, purposes, and projects of human beings (indeed, of sentient creatures in general). At least some of the value of the natural environment must be independent of the role it can play in furthering human purposes, or the purposes of sentient creatures in general. Without this condition, an environment based ethic would collapse into a human or sentient based ethic, an ethic of environmental management. Secondly, it was argued that, at least at first glance, intrinsic value must be objective. At least some of the value of the natural environment must be independent of attitudes of approval, or disapproval, indeed, independent of mental properties in general.