Berkeley and epistemology

Robert Merrihew Adams

pp. 143-161

in: Ernest Sosa (ed), Essays on the philosophy of George Berkeley, Berlin, Springer, 1987

Abstract

Probably the most popular of Berkeley's arguments against the extramental existence of matter is the epistemological argument that we have no reason to believe in such a thing. For Berkeley himself this was by no means the most important argument. In fact, it is not fully developed in the Three Dialogues, but only in sections 18-20 of the Principles. The reason for the secondary role accorded this argument by Berkeley is indicated by the opening sentence of section 18: "But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, yet how is it possible for us to know this?" Berkeley thinks he has proved that the ex-tramental existence of such substances is not even possible. That proof engages his primary interest, and the argument of insufficient evidence comes in only to back it up, for readers who may not have been convinced by the impossibility proof. Nonetheless, Berkeley's epistemological argument is of great interest, both for its own sake and for what it can teach us about the relation between metaphysics and epistemology.

Cited authors

Berkeley George