The demise of logical positivism

implications of the duhem-quine thesis for psychology

Stam

pp. 17-24

in: Charles W. Tolman (ed), Positivism in psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1992

Abstract

I intend to focus here on the collapse of logical positivism or more generally, logical empiricism, by focusing on the Duhem-Quine thesis. My reason for doing this is primarily because of the absence of discussions of this thesis in methodology in the mainstream psychological literature. I do not attempt a historical overview but focus instead on the logical problems inherited by psychology in its adoption of positivist tenets. Whenever psychologists discuss the demise of positivism, they quickly point to the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, or even Popper as the leading causes of the demise. Depending on the purposes for which they invoke these names, this triumvirate is either promptly dismissed as unrealistic about science or gratefully embraced as representing the new beginning.

Cited authors

Popper Karl

Quine Willard Van Orman