On the function of folk psychology in the theory and history of psychology

Helmut Hildebrandt

pp. 415-422

in: Michael E. Hyland, William J. Baker, René van Hezewijk, Terwee (eds), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstract

In modern cognitive science the relation of experimental psychology to folk psychology is controversial. But there are some propositions about the explanations folk psychology gives that are generally shared. The main emphasis is laid on a rationalistic account of the structure of mental processes. This view of folk psychology is new and its consequences for cognitive science are challenged by historical forerunners of folk psychology. The example of a hermeneutical psychology discussed heavily in German psychology between the two world wars shows very different opinions on folk psychology. During this period the main points of interest were a theory of individuality and personality that includes emotionality and irrationality. Therefore, one can draw some conclusions for the debate between proponents and opponents of a strong relation of folk psychology to cognitive science. First, folk psychology relies very much on global historical situations and traditions. Second, folk psychology as a social phenomenon may serve as a point of referral for a historical examination of the development of psychology and then offers a possibility to discuss externalistic influences on scientific psychology. But in this case, the inner theoretical reference is abandoned.