Causal connection

William Ruddick

Schuster

pp. 419-449

in: Robert S. Cohen, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), Proceedings of the Boston colloquium for the philosophy of science 1966/1968, Berlin, Springer, 1969

Abstract

Philosophers often attend to our common judgments, however casual or erroneous. The language we commonly use and the errors we commonly make are supposed to clarify the principles of sound judgment. That supposition has, I think, been justified by the results of attending closely to our common judgments in matters of perception, morals and logic. But curiously, philosophers have tended to neglect our common causal judgments. They have been causal snobs preoccupied with "the right causes", those endorsed by the scientific élite. There is concern only with long-established causes such as billiard balls, freezing water, flipped switches, and indigestible dinners. The popular causes of the common man — Fate, charms, conspiracies, and various divinities — are beneath consideration and contempt. Even causes once favored by scientists themselves are neglected: the planet Vulcan attracts no more philosophic attention than its ancient namesake.