The kingdom of ends

Thomas E. Hill

pp. 307-315

in: Lewis White Beck (ed), Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Berlin, Springer, 1972

Abstract

Philosophers of the British and American analytic school have, quite understandably, taken much interest in the formulations of the Categorical Imperative concerned with universal law and laws of nature. Recital of standard objections to these formulas is now part of almost every elementary course in the history of ethics. Polite notice is often given to Kant's injunction to treat humanity as an end in itself, but little attention, unfortunately, has been paid to the imperative to regard oneself a legislating member of a possible kingdom of ends. I propose to sketch an interpretation, or reconstruction, of this form of the Categorical Imperative, treating it, as at least in part it was meant to be treated, as a guide for moral living. More specifically, I want to suggest that the formula of the kingdom of ends combines the main ideas of the other formulations, just as Kant implies that it should, and that his formula is in important respects an improvement over the much discussed first formulation. At the end I shall consider two natural objections to the kingdom of ends principle. These objections, unlike the familiar objections to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, raise questions about the most central features of Kant's ethical theory.

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel