The conception of lawlikeness in Kant's philosophy of science

Gerd Buchdahl

pp. 149-171

in: Lewis White Beck (ed), Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Berlin, Springer, 1972

Abstract

If we want to grasp Kant's approach to the philosophy of science we need to be clear about the demarcation between the latter and his general transcendental approach as formulated in the "Analytic of Principles' of the Critique of Pure Reason (A130 = B169). The lines of demarcation have not been usually appreciated very clearly. Common to many scholars is the belief that Kant intended to lay the foundations of Newtonian "nature" in the analytical portions of the first Critique. In reality, there is a considerable gap. Many scholars do not even notice this gap. Others do, but they then think that Kant did not. and proceed to charge him with the failure of having appreciated the gap, thus misconstruing his intentions. Naturally there must be a reason for this state of affairs which can be traced partly to Kant's language and mode of presentation. Yet, the result of overlooking this gap, this looseness of fit, between Kant's theory of Newtonian science and the Transcendental Analytic, has the additional baneful result of causing us to misrepresent the significance and limitations of the latter itself. In particular, this affects our ideas about the relevance of the Analogies of Experience whose bearing in this connection is frequently misunderstood.

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel