Torn by reason
Łukasiewicz on the principle of contradiction
pp. 429-444
in: Sorin Costreie (ed), Early analytic philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2016Abstract
In 1910, Jan Łukasiewicz published a groundbreaking book, On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. The book contained a critique of the traditional attitude to the Principle of Non-Contradiction, and a reevaluation of its significance in the light of contemporary developments in logic. In the first half of the book, Łukasiewicz produced an analysis of Aristotle's defence of the Principle in the Metaphysics, showing its deep inadequacy. In the second half of the book, Łukasiewicz, in his own terms, considers the pros and cons of the principle. The present paper provides an analysis and commentary on the second half of the book. Łukasiewicz is seen to be badly torn. Though he eventually endorses the principle, he does so, not in virtue of the evidence he considers, but in despite of it. In particular, he considers arguments against the Principle, drawn from Hegel, Meinong, and the paradoxes of self-reference, but rejects them for what appear to be patently inadequate reasons.
