Postscript

Wolfram Hogrebe

Adam Knowles

pp. 129-130

in: Nathan Rotenstreich, Synthesis and intentional objectivity, Berlin, Springer, 1998

Abstract

The term phenomenology was introduced into the vocabulary of philosophy by J.H. Lambert, in his book Neues Organon. Lambert presented thoughts about the investigation of the truth and its distinction, on the one hand, from mistake, which stems from judgment led astray, and, on the other, from Schein, which refers to objects in their appearance. Notwithstanding the association of the term phenomenology with the classical term phainomenon, there is a difference between that which is given as a phenomenon and Schein, paralleling the difference between distinctive reality and that which is brilliant or striking. Schopenhauer even suggested a terminological affinity between Schein und Schon, and while the etymology may be questionable, it is indicative of the allusion to that which strikes the eye. Herder emphasized the connection between Schein and aesthetics. Schein is not an illusion — though illusion is a common English translation of the term.