Skills, procedural knowledge, and knowledge-how

Benoît Gaultier

pp. 4959-4981

in: Matteo Colombo, Raoul Gervais, Jan Sprenger (eds), Objectivity in science, Synthese 194 (12), 2017.

Abstract

My main intention in this article is to settle the question whether having the ability to (Phi ) is, as Ryleans think, necessary for knowing how to (Phi ), and to determine the kind of role played by procedural knowledge in knowing how to (Phi ) and in acquiring and possessing the ability to (Phi ). I shall argue, in a seemingly anti-Rylean fashion, that when it comes to know-hows that are ordinarily categorised as physical skills, or—to be, for the moment, philosophically neutral—as enabling one to possess such skills, it is necessary to have procedural knowledge of how to (Phi ) in order to possess those know-hows. However, I shall contend that this knowledge cannot be acquired without acquiring the kind of ability to (Phi ) in which having the skill to (Phi ) consists. And that having acquired the ability to (Phi ) is not only necessary but also sufficient for having acquired procedural knowledge of how to succeed in (Phi )-ing.