

Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History.

By Paul Miliukov.

It is a moot question — that of the relation of Russia to Europe. Does Russia belong to Europe? If so, how could it happen that Russia for so many centuries of her history remained isolated from Western Europe? If Russia does not belong to Europe, then what is she? Is she Asiatic? Or does she possess a kind of civilisation of her own? Or, probably, no civilisation at all? The question was often discussed outside as well as inside Russia and of course, not only from mere curiosity. It divided our friends and enemies abroad, and it served to support or to combat one of two opposite trends of Russian internal politics: widely European or narrowly national. Shall Russia borrow advanced ideas and institutions from Europe? Or shall she stick to the traditions of her past? Can foreign institutions be borrowed at all? Can old traditions be kept? Public opinion accepted now one now other of these opinions. The government acted alternately. In the meantime the very bases of dispute shifted more than once, in accordance with new political events and new acquisitions of historical and political science. What is then the present position of the question, especially after Russia has passed through the extraordinary experience of the last decade?

In close connection with that very experience a new solution of the question was tried a few years ago by the representatives of the young generation. This solution cannot be neglected, all the more because at the first glance it seems very plausible and attractive. Russia is neither European nor Asiatic. Russia is Eurasian. The term of Eurasia is not new. It was used by geographers in order to designate both continents, Europe and Asia, taken together. The meaning of the term in this connection is neutral. The new group of writers who call themselves „Eurasians“ use it in a special sense. Eurasia is the Eastern part of Europe and the western part of Asia. There is nothing to object to even in this narrower significance of the term. Eurasia as a connecting link between Europe and Asia, partaking of both, a stage of transition from one to the other: why not? Well, this may be your opinion and mine. It is not the meaning in which the „Eurasians“ use the term. Eurasia is, according to them, a geographical unit, closed in itself and shut up from all the rest of the world. It serves thus as a separate landscape or „place of development“ for a civilisation unique in its way, inimitable and intransmissible. The Eurasians find their support in a philosophy of history, according to which each historical fact is unique in its individuality and cannot be repeated. History is „Idiography“. However, at the same time somewhat contradictorily, they attribute to this civilisation an exceptional power of expansion. How can it be otherwise if this civilisation is to accomplish a special historical mission. The Eurasian civilisation is predestined to

save mankind from that final decay which menaces the old and decrepit civilisation of Europe. The proof of the reality of such a mission is contained in the special character and temperament of the „Turanian“ peoples of Eurasia, capable of great deeds, and first and foremost, in the absolute and universal Truth contained in the Russian form of religion — the Orthodox church. The great Russian revolution gives an additional proof, as some of its achievements already contain more than a promise, — a first approximate realisation of the mission mentioned.

The contradiction just underlined is not original in the Eurasian doctrine, nor is the doctrine itself original. The universal mission of Russia was preached by the originators of the so-called slavophil doctrine, the Russian religious philosophers of 1840—1850, such as Kireyevsky and Khomyakov, while the inimitable peculiarity of the Russian „cultural“ type was particularly emphasised by an epigone, the reactionary of 1870—1880, N. Danilevsky. However, the „Eurasian“ doctrine was developed in an opposite direction. They first began by underlining the Eurasian idiographic singleness and then proceeded to extol the international qualities of the Russians as manifested in the Great Revolution. To explain this, we must draw attention to the origin of the Eurasian movement. It originated among a young group of emigrées in Sofia in 1921, in direct connection with the outburst of nationalist feelings provoked by the unfortunate end of the Great War. We have here a close parallel with the same feelings raised by our defeat in the Crimean war of 1855, which caused Danilevsky to write his renowned book on „Russia and Europe“. Danilevsky started with the question: „why Europe hates Russia“, and after having stated that these two civilisations are as incommensurable as animal types breathing through gills and through lungs, he invited his compatriots to hate Europe.

The „Eurasians“ themselves tell us their psychology at the moment when their doctrine was in process of building. This is how they preface their first collection of tracts, published in 1921 in Sofia („The Exodus to the East. Forebodings and Achievements“). „These articles were composed in the atmosphere of a world catastrophe. The time we live in, since the beginning of the war, does not seem to us to be a stage of transition but a turning point. What happens to-day is not a commotion, but a crisis, and we expect from what is to come a radical change in the present outlook of the world.“ As a result the present civilisation is not to be perfected but entirely replaced by another one. Which one? M. Savitsky, one of the chief leaders of the Eurasian movement, explains the sense of the new millenium to come. He gives us the scheme of „migration“ of consecutive civilisations. Every thousand years, it appears, civilisation shifted five degrees northwards. Beginning with +20° and more of the average annual temperature to territories with +15, then, after Christ, to those with +10, from these again, during the last thousand years, to +5° C. Accordingly, at the beginning of the third thousand years A. D. civilisation has to move again — M. Savitsky says quite seriously — to +0° C, — which brings us to the Arctic zone. Next will probably come the North pole. This time, it is „the territory which we call Eurasia“ and the Russian people in company with the „Turanians“ will play the leading part in the coming cataclism. Let me state that astounding conclusion in their own words. „The multinational unit of civilisation of Eurasia

has to realise its all human historical mission: to them it means that to our epoch belongs the leading and principal part in the rank of human civilisations.“

As time went on and the panic produced by the expectation of apocalyptic events subsided, the Eurasians become somewhat more realistic. It was then that they began to praise the Russian revolution. But let us first come to details in order to see how they prove the above-mentioned statements.

In the first place they had to prove that Eurasia, in their sense, really exists, i. e. that certain peculiarities of climate and soil make of the territory they called Eurasian a special world, with its separate civilisation, independent of any other. M. Savitsky developed this thesis in two booklets with a very great display of learning: „Russia is a separate geographical world“ and „The particularities of Russian Geography, part 1. Vegetation and soil“ (1927). As a result of his study, M. Savitsky comes to the following conclusions: 1. That Eurasia forms a separate circle, an „orbis terrarum“ (or, in Greek, „οἰκουμένη“). It represents the real continent removed from seas, an „Ocean“ in itself. It surrounds the „Mongolian center“ from which comes the unifying political process. The present territory of S.S.S.R. roughly corresponds to Eurasia. Nine tenths of this territory were first united under the sway of Jenghis khan, in XIII century. There followed the Empires of Timur, in XIV century, Moscow, XV century, Petersburg in XVIII, always in the same latitudes, going from the East to the West. 2. From the economic point of view, this separate world is self-sufficient, by the force of attraction of its own market. No foreign trade is necessary. All centres of ancient asiatic civilisations, China, Japan, India, Persia, which communicate with the Ocean, lie outside Eurasia. 3. The unity of the Eurasian geographic landscape is formed by the uniform horizontal extension of four climatic zones of Russia, which represent four parallel „flaglike“ stripes and go from East to West. They are: tundra, forest, steppe and desert. The two extreme stripes — tundra and desert — represent a certain symmetry and the whole disposition is „periodical“. Non here beside Eurasia does such a disposition of climates exist to emphasise the geographic unity of Eurasia, Savitsky avoids using general terms of „European“ and „Asiatic“ Russia. He substitutes for them other terms more convenient for his new continent: „Cis-“ and „Trans-Ural Russia“. Of course, Ural is nearer to the „Mongolian center“ than Moscow.

However, the great difficulty remains: it is impossible to weld together these two parts of Russia: they are too disparate. Let us look with more attention at these four stripes of the Eurasian flag in order to see just what makes them so „organically“ united as to form an indivisible whole, with the exclusion of everything else. We shall see that this unity does not exist. Neither the northern tundra, nor the southern desert are particular to Russia. The tundra extends through the whole of the Northern hemisphere and is typical of the arctic zone which is indeed a world in itself, with its own vegetation and inhabitants. But it has nothing to do with the habitable parts of the Old and the New world. The „desert“ in the South-Eastern corner of Russia is only a small projection of an immense belt of sandy deserts which stretch out from Asia — not to the West in the direction of Europe, but to the South-West from Gobi and Karakum to Arabia and Sahara. There remain thus but of the four stripes only two which really played an important part in Russian history: the forest

and the steppe. But their respective part is misinterpreted and converted by the Eurasians. The steppe is certainly a medium which transmitted Asiatic influences to Russia. It forms a direct continuation of Asiatic pastures which led Turkish and Mongolian horsemen to Europe. But as we go westwards the steppe becomes more and more narrow. It disappears entirely on the Eastern slope of the Carpathian mountains and at the mouth of the Danube, not without sending, however, its last projection to the Hungarian plain which used to serve as the last abode of the Asiatic nomads coming to Europe.

We now come to the largest zone of all four and the most typical of Russia: the great forest. It is also not particular to Russia. But, contrarily to the steppe, it is not connected with Asia, but with Western Europe. It is a direct continuation of the great Hercynian forest of the Ancient geographers. The earliest description of the customs of its inhabitants, which we read in Tacitus' *Germania*, sets forth the contrast between the life in the woods and the life in the steppes. „Venedae (the supposed ancient name of the Slavs), sais Tacitus, are counted among the Germans, because they have settled dwellings and walk on foot which all contrasts with the Sarmatae, who live in cars and on horseback.“

We must admit that the Law of the Russian forest — so to say, its dynamics — is different from that of the European West. It enters Russia in the form of a wedge, whose basis is on the Western frontier, and whose thin edge is on the other side of the Urals. As we go eastwards, the tundra and the steppe encroach on the forest from the North and from the South. Under which influences? Strange enough, M. Savitsky through all his minute researches, does not pay attention to a predominant feature of the Russian climate which serves to explain it — and which, though, is mentioned by one of his authorities: „the growing continentality of climate“ (p. 125). It is a very well known fact that damp and cold winds from the Arctic Ocean and dry and hot winds from Asiatic deserts disunite the two factors whose combined action alone can produce luxuriant vegetation: moisture and heat. The result is that, as we go to the East, the difference between extreme heat in summer and extreme cold in winter increases. The increasing amplitude between the two produces most important changes in conditions of life of plants, animals and human societies. It is important to notice at once that the change is gradual and that it develops in the direction from the West to the East. The following figures may illustrate these statements. The amplitude, i. e. the distance between the average temperatures of the warmest and the coldest month is, as follows:

Maritime climate:	1. British isles, narrow strip of seashore in Spain, France and Norway	10—15°
Transitional:	2. Norway, Southern Sweden, Denmark, Western Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Balkan peninsula	15—20°
Continentale climate: (moderate)	3. Eastern Germany, Poland, Russia west from the line Petersburg—Odessa, Crimea, Caucasus	20—25°
	4. Russia west from the line Archangel—Moscow—Rostov on Don—Astrakhan	25—30°

	5. The Volga basin, Southern Ural chain, Transcaspian region	30—35°
	6. Western Siberia, the narrow strip of Russian colonisation eastwards (Tobolsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk), Far Eastern Sea—shore	35—40°
Extreme continental climate:	7. Eastern Siberia, Mongolia with the exclusion of No 8 and 9	40—45°
	8. Eastern confluent of Yenisey, the basin of the Amur river	45—50°
	9. The basin of Lena (with the exclusion of No. 10)	50—60°
	10. The central part of it (Yakutsk, Verkhoyansk)	60—65°

One can easily see how the conditions of civilised life change as we go to the East within the limits of the Eurasia of the Eurasians, how much they vary and how much nearer to Europe, than to Asiatic part they are in the Cis-Ural side of Eurasia (NNo. 3, 4, 5). No civilised life is possible where the extreme limit of continental climate (and of Eurasia) is reached (No. 9, 10). It is the country of nomads and hunters. Where is then the supposed unity of Eurasian civilisation? It is true, speaking generally, that civilisations develop in the direction from hot climates to moderate zones. And it is equally obvious that in southern Europe — the Europe of peninsulas and the isles, the original process of civilisation develops from the East to the West: from Egypt, Asia Minor and Aegean Archipelagus to Greece, Rome, the Italian latinised provinces of Spain, France, British Isles — probably also Southern Scandinavia. But later on, on the continent proper of Europe, the development goes in the opposite direction: from the East to the West. The modern European States were built in the following chronological and geographical order:

- V—VII centuries A. D. on the rivers of Seine and Loire (No. 2)
- VII—VIII „ East of Rhine (No. 2)
- IX—XI „ on the Eastern marches of Germany. (No. 3)
- IX—XII „ on the Dneper (Southwestern Russia, No. 3)
- XI—XIII „ between Oka and Volga rivers (Central Russia, No. 4)
- XIII—XV „ Moscow (No. 4—5)
- XVI—XVII „ Russian colonisation of Siberia (No. 6).

Of course, they are not exactly the same kind of States, nor is it the same kind of civilisation which develops from Paris to Moscow under a more or less continental climate. The Eurasians are perfectly right to assert that each case of this development is individual and never to be repeated. But there is no reason to emphasise the Russian case as being unique. If Russians are not like Germans, Germans are not like French, and French are not like English. With even more right one can affirm that Turks and Tartars are not like Russians, Mongols are not Turks, and Chinese are not Mongols. The Eurasians themselves invalidate their own theory of absolute singleness of every case while they subdivide these series in three groups of Europeans, Eurasians and Asiatics. Why just these three? Where is the breach in the series? Where do the Europeans finish and Eurasi-

ans begin? Where do the Eurasians finish and the Asiatics begin? The gist of the contention lies there. Which are, then, the attributes of each group that may serve as „fundamentum divisionis“ — the essentials of such a grouping of civilisations?

The answer, of course, is not easy. It is very often dictated by national ambition. I recently came across a book written by a certain Geroges Edouard Husson under the title „Occitanism“ (Paris 1920). According to it the real Europe finishes this side of Rhine. Beyond it begins „the world of eternal Barbarians“ and from there blows an „accursed Asiatic spirit“ (pp. 76, 198). The author preaches a federation of British and Latinised peoples representing a „mediterranean-atlantic civilisation“, — of course unique and intransmissible — just as that of the Eurasians. As is known, for a certain period of years the peoples beyond the Rhine were commonly called barbarian. However, German nationalists in their turn did not wait for this theory to come, in order to repay the thick and brown brachycephalous Latins. According to them, it was the Great Northern race, tall, dolichocephalous and fair-haired that brought to the world of barbarians the present civilisation. One hears the same thing repeated if one comes to the Vistula. Polish patriots will tell one that their country is the real bulwark of Europe and that it was their ancestors who saved Europe from Moscovite barbarous „Turians“. The Eurasian („Turian“) doctrine, of course, was warmly greeted and gladly accepted in that country. But then, do not the Russians themselves claim — with more approximation to the historical truth, that they were the crusaders who averted the Mongol conquest from Europe? Let us admit that each of the above mentioned claims contains a part of the truth. But where is then the end of European civilisation? From physiography let us come to history for arguments. We can do it without leaving out of scope the discovered physiographical data.

We saw that the Russian forest, in a certain sense, is European, while the steppe alone is Asiatic. But Russian history is a continued report about the struggle between these two elements, the steppe against the forest at the beginning; the forest against the steppe at the end. The only Russian historian who tried to explain Russian history in a Eurasian sense, the young M. Vernadsky (now at Yale) gave these very titles to the corresponding periods of Russian history. It is true, that before Vladimir the Saint (972 A. D.) and after Peter the Great he speaks of the „unification“ of the steppe and the forest. But unification does not differ here from subjection.

There was, to be sure, a period when the tent of a nomad sheltered a higher type of civilisation, than the hamlet of the hunter in the forest. But that was in prehistoric times. Some scholars suggest indeed, that the horsemen were the first to build larger human hordes than was possible for the men on foot. But then the archeologists would tell us that the „back-provinces“ of sedentary culture in the forest have finally won the race. The early culture of the Slavs was, to be sure, also a very poor one. The Eastern Slavs lived in separate groups scattered through woods and marshes. They caught fish in the rivers and chased fur-bearing animals. Agriculture was in its first beginnings. They were unable to evolve out of their tribal life a machinery of the State. But neither could the nomads of the steppe help then over that tribal stage of existence. It was the

„men from the North“ — the same as at the same time were building states in other parts of Europe — who also became the first builders of the Russian State. Of course, at the beginning the „Norman conquest“ of Russia was far from being complete. It reminds us very much of the conquests of the nomads. To use the term of Mr. Ancel, a French scholar, the conquerors were dromocrats, i. e. sovereigns of the ways or, practically, of chief currents of rivers, because in the primitive forest rivers were the only means of communication. However after a century of occupation, some steady centers of sedentary civilisation were built round Kiyev. The elements of that civilisation were Norman, Byzantine and — in the third place only — Oriental. There were periods of truce with the steppe, and some rests of nomad tribes which were driven away from the steppe by new waves of nomads coming from Asia sought refuge on the outskirts of the newly built State. A mixed population appeared on the southern frontier. But all these features were secondary. The leading trait was — an unremitting struggle with the Asiatics, — a struggle which lasted from the origin of Russian history until the end of XVIII century in Europe and until the end of XIX century in Asia. At the periods of peace Russian settlers colonised the steppe. Now and then they recoiled. But beginning with the end of XV century, when the Moscovite state grew in force, the flood of Russian colonisation ran fast, though hampered by regular raids of the knights of the steppe, under the protection of Moscovite regiments and of their fortified walls. After many centuries of arrest, the Russian population took possession of the blessed black soil of southern Russia. The steppe disappeared under the plough at the end of XIX century.

How do the Eurasians interpret this early part of Russian history, the struggle of Europe against Asia, in order to make fit it to their scheme? In the first place they emphasise the complexity of the Russian ethnical structure, being a mixture of Slav and „Turian“ elements (i. e. Finns, Turks, Mongols etc. The term is obsolete; „Ural-Altai“ took its place in science). As matter of fact, there exist no „pure“ and unmixed races in the world. The mongoloid brachycephalic type forms since the neolithic period one of the chief component parts of all European races. It is true, that a more recent mixture of blood took place between Russian Slavs and Ural-Altai elements as a result of Russian colonisation of the North-East of European Russia. The part of the steppe was here quite insignificant. Then the Eurasians try to draw a distinction between the Slavonic and the Turian psychological types. According to them the qualities of discipline of obedience, the capacity for building large states are a particular privilege of the Turians. Why not that of the Vikings? It is hardly necessary to state that the method and the conclusion are here equally unscientific.

But now comes for the Eurasians their chance. After two centuries of brilliant existence (XI-XII), in connection with Byzantium and with the Western European states, Southern Russia was invaded and Kiyev brought to ruin. North-Eastern Russia recently colonised by their princes is conquered by the Mongols. Moscow, the rising new centre, formed, with the rest of Russia, the Russian part of the „ulus“ in the state of the Golden Horde, Kipchak, belonging to J u j i, the eldest son of Jenghis-khan, and to his successors. The Eurasians introduced this Great but unstable Empire as a link in the chain between Scythians, Sarmatae and Huns, on one side, and the Moscovite State and the

Empire of Peter the Great, on the other. Obviously, this attempt to build a kind of political tradition was utterly artificial. In the first place, contrary to the assertions of the Eurasians, the Mongol Empires in Asia did not at all coincide with geographical limits they give to their Eurasia. Mongol invaders always wished to conquer the most civilised and the richest parts of Asia, such as China, Persia, India, when possible. They thus extended their dominion to the South, while the Russian Empire expanded to the North from the central „nucleus“ of Mongolia proper. It is perfectly true that friendly relations between the khans of the Golden Horde and the Moscovite princes essentially contributed to the elevation of Moscow at the expense of other competitors from the same family and finally also at the detriment of Lithuania. But far from changing the main line of Russia historical process the khans only helped to accelerate the process of unification of Russia which had begun already. It was the result of internal processes of fastening of the princely power, over the solidified mass of the population. The direct influence of the Mongol yoke, as well as of the previous invasion from the steppe, was, as we saw it, negative. It prevented Russian colonisation for centuries from occupying the most productive part of Russia. Considering the unification of Russia under one central power, — the only process positively aided by the Mongols, — it was substantially European. It took place almost at the same time—XV-XVI centuries—when standing armies and great European monarchies appeared in the West.

To be sure, the Moscovite army and Moscovite monarchy looked very Oriental. The military reform begun by John III, the contemporary of Mohammed II, was achieved by John IV, the contemporary of Suleiman the Splendid. Turkish influence in Moscow, through the intermediacy of Southern Slavs and Greeks, is very probable. But the Turks themselves had borrowed these and other institutions from Byzantium. The Eurasians contend that the newly-born autocratic power of the Moscovite Grand Duke, as well as the idea that the prince was the sole owner of the land while other possessors had merely the temporary tenure of it, and finally the fact of complete submission of the population to the idea of the obligatory and universal service to the state — that all this was directly due to the Mongol influence. The question is much more complicated. Many institutes introduced by the Moscovite Tsars had been the common property of Byzantine Emperors, Mussulman khalifs and Turkish sultans. The period of their borrowing goes far beyond the possible influence of the Mongol yoke. On the other hand, according to the researches of a prematurely deceased Russian historian Pavlov-Silvansky, feudal institutions very much similar those of the West played a much more important part in Russian history than had been generally supposed. One also must take in consideration that the nomad „Empires“ were exceedingly unstable. They mostly dwindled down directly after their foundation. The reason is that Mongol conquerors were also a kind of Dromocrats, dominating the ways of communication alone and that their solid acquisitions did not go generally beyond territories where they found some elements of ready military organisations. On the borders of their empires — and Russia was such a border — they were satisfied with vassal subjection of local dynasts and with regular payment of tribute collected by local authorities, without interfering in the internal administration.

Thus far we do not meet with the direct influence from the West, although we find that the whole of Russian development however belated, was also far from being „Eurasian“. Now we come to a period, when connections with Western Europe become more and more regular and, after a century of preparation, by the will of Peter the Great, Russia entered as an equal member into the European system of states. The Eurasians ring the alarm. Russia has deviated from her historical path. Russia's ruling class has broken with the people and committed treason against the national tradition. The Orthodox faith was shattered in its foundations as the state and the whole trend of life were secularised and the Church was subjected to the State. At the same time the Russian „intelligentsia“ appeared despising national traditions and bent on blind imitation of foreign ideas and fashions. In a word, „European“ civilisation was definitely adopted and the „Eurasian“ spirit seemed buried for ever under new historical strata.

And indeed, two centuries passed without any change in the direction taken by Peter. Russian „intelligentsia“ developed a literature, an art, a science which were universally recognised as having reached the European level without repudiating national inspiration. Last doubts about „Europeanism“ of Russia seemed to disappear as Russia since the end of XIX century decidedly entered the stage of industrial development and made liberal European institutions her own. Happily for the Eurasian doctrine all that line of development finished by a catastrophe which blew away these superior strata of European civilisation and laid bare the subsoil which was supposed to bear in it the Eurasian spirit. It was the advent of Bolshevism. The Eurasians met it with ever increasing sympathy.

It meant — as M. Savitsky interpreted it — that „Russia dropped off from the framework of European forms of existence“. She became again the true, the „Eurasian“ Russia. Does not, indeed, the „Eurasian tradition admit most risky experiments and most stormy explosions“? Does one not discern here „the old instincts of the steppe“? The Eurasians forgot what they were saying about the „discipline“ and „obedience“ learnt from the nomads. They are now sure that „the Russian revolution preserves in its depths a germ of national genius“. May be, it is a „sinful“, a „criminal“ outburst. But they see in it a genuinely Russian, though deformed, manifestation of a great historical mission, of a „new word“ that Russia is going to say unto the world. „Bolshevism is a profoundly national phenomenon“, M. Suvchinsky proclaimed as early as 1921. Accordingly, bolshevist achievements are treated in an extremely favorable way. The Bolsheviks perform the function of an „unconscious weapon of a renascent Statehood“. They wisely preserved for the future the elements of a „ruling class“ among which also „the vital elements of the old class are kept alive“, while the new ones „grow up naturally from the rock of the people“. „The power of the Soviets represents a good analogy with the power of the Tsar“. In a word, it does not remain much to change in order to replace the power of communists with that of the Eurasians. One has only to put religion in the place of atheism and materialism, and to reorganise the ruling minority by selecting a new minority of such members as would submit to being „subjects of the (Eurasian) idea“. Of course, it will not be a democratic régime; the Eurasians believe in the „crisis of democracy“ and object to democratic rule. Their régime will be „ideocratic“ and „demotic“. The newly organised party will rule alone — with „the exclusion

of all others" — just as the Bolsheviks do. The Eurasians will „consciously realise the unconscious will of the whole“. While keeping in „organic union with people“ they will at the same time „develop their own schemes and carry through their own will“. It may remind one alike of Lenin and of Mussolini. However, it is not so dangerous as the whole construction is obviously theoretical, artificial and utopian.

And indeed, new difficulties and contradictions arise at every step as one analyses this part of the Eurasian doctrine. It was much easier to build for the old „Slavophiles“, their predecessors, because they had in view the Russian people alone, while the new application of the old idea has to cover the whole of Eurasia. How can Orthodoxy be reconciled with Buddhism, with Islam, with Asiatic heathen creeds? The Eurasians give an unflinching but suicidal answer. Why, they declare, is not Paganism also a kind of „potential Orthodoxy“? It is even nearer to Orthodoxy, than to the „latin“ and protestant creed. Nearer not only „geographically“ and „ethnographically“, but also culturally. Namely, both Paganism and Orthodoxy equally represent a „primitive form of religion“! All right then, but what about such highly developed forms of religion as Buddhism and Islam. Never mind they also „gravitate to Orthodoxy as to their centre“. The Oriental world, they are sure, „will freely develop itself into Orthodoxy“ while creating „new, specific forms of it“. But then, it will be no more the real, historical Orthodoxy of Russia? The Eurasians are ready to sacrifice it. They do not all „idealise the historical reality“. They do not deny „the sins of the Russian Church and people“. To make it easier, they even introduce a new conception of the Eurasian personality. It is not like others; it is synthetic or, as they prefer to call it, „symphonic“. It represents the „unity of plurality“. A harmony can be reached in it „by means of an embittered mutual struggle of peoples, groups, individuals which compose it“. What do then these component parts have in common if an embittered struggle is necessary in order somehow to assimilate them? Contrary to the evidence, the Eurasians contrive to find „some common potentiality“ in the languages of Eurasian (i.e. Uralo-Altaiic and Arian) peoples belonging to remotest groups. At the same time they deny to other Slav nations their congeniality with the Russians. The Slavs remain outside Eurasia!

The Eurasians are forced to recognise, though, that one cannot „identify the Russian culture with the Turanian“. But they naively add that „it is more useful to speak of the Turanian culture“. Anyhow, the „specific Russian culture is Eurasian“. „We must recognise ourselves as Eurasians in order to recognise ourselves as Russians“. Just what kind of civilisation it is, the Eurasians can not tell us. But they know that their hypothetical civilisation forms an „organic whole“, that it cannot be borrowed and that it is bound to appear at once and of a piece — in politics, economics, private life, ethnical type, geographical particularities of territory“. Does such a civilisation already exist? Or is it first to be created? In this last case when and by whom? Does the people itself create its culture? Or do it do his more cultivated elements? Prince Nicholas Trubetskoy — one of the Eurasian leaders, tries to answer these important questions in an article entitled: „The upper and the lower strata of Russian culture“. I cannot abide by his mistakes; it is more important to state his frank confessions. In

the first place, he avows that, indeed Russian culture, as the Eurasians understand it, is first to be created. At present, there exist only certain ethnic elements for it in the masses. These elements are: language, popular songs, dances and ornaments. Trubetskoy tries to prove that all these elements are more „Turanian“ than Slav. Anyhow, he admits that by themselves they are not sufficient to build a culture. An upper class is needed in order to refine them. An intellectual exchange between the upper and the lower strata is necessary, in order to transform „ethnographic“ material into „national“ riches. There will always be certain things in the process of that exchange which the lower stratum cannot and will not understand. Orthodox religion belongs to that category. The masses simplified the imported religion according to their understanding. Nor can the upper class be satisfied with the byzantine religion; generally speaking, „it is impossible to return to Byzantine tradition“. The possibility of borrowing the elements of a national culture is here implicitly admitted, as well as the necessity of a class of „intelligentia“ — in order to give the national character to the borrowed elements. It is also admitted the inevitableness of a different treatment of religion on the part of the intellectuals and of the masses. No real national culture without refinement, and no refinement without secularisation of thought and of life: such is the pertinent conclusion from prince Trubetskoy's premisses. He also admits that under such conditions a certain breach between the upper and lower strata will always ensue. There remains the question of more or less. The more remote is the foreign source, the larger the breach. We return here to the appreciation of comparative remoteness or congeniality of the (supposed) Turanian or the (real) European sources of civilisation. It is useless to discuss them again. Let us assume that there are no foreign sources of civilisation available. Will it destroy the force of argument that every national culture which deserves that name needs previous differentiation of society and a certain degree of refinement and secularisation of an upper thinking group of men? Even a self-made and „inimitable“ culture must submit to this general Law of civilisation.

Russia did submit to it. The greatest flaw in the Eurasian construction is that they ignore this. While they attempt, with insufficient means, to construe a hypothetical civilisation for some time to come and hope to make use for it of the supposed revival of the Asiatic spirit — or of a sort of *tabula rasa*, brought about by the Bolshevik revolution, — Russian civilisation does exist and its basis can be no more changed. As matter of fact, this civilisation is European. It is such by reason of its parallel development with Europe — not with Asia — at the early periods when the basis of national character is usually laid down. It is European by its victory over the Asiatic elements of the steppe. It is European even in its Siberian projection, because it brought to the barbarians and the nomads the elements of European culture. It is especially European in its educated class which was formed since Peter the Great's reign and which substantially contributed to the blossoming of the national creative power. Russian civilisation is European as it is proven by democratic strivings of the elite of its educated class, the Russian „intelligentia“, which since the end of XVIII century, successfully fought against serfdom and autocracy. It is European even in its mistakes and exaggerations. It is European in the initial idea of Russian revolution being a fight for equality and freedom as against the nationalistic

tradition of social privilege and political oppression. The Eurasians have come too late, to deny all that and to defend this tradition. They themselves agree that it will never return. They are also right in their assertion that the Russian revolution is „not a savage and senseless revolt“, but „a profound and essential process“, which „opens the way to sound principles of state building“. Their mistake was only to misconceive the passing stage of the revolution for its definite result.

To conclude, I must say a few words about the fate of the Eurasian doctrine. It enjoyed a good initial success as it struck the chord which sounded loud in the hearts of the young generation. One had the feeling of taking a personal part in a battle of giants. One wistfully looked for a world conflagration. And then, everybody could find in the new doctrine what he wished to find: universal religion or narrow nationalism, a realistic view of the present or a utopian construction of the future, a defense of the old regime or a justification of Bolshevism. Very soon, however, this multiformity and its inherent contradictions proved fatal to the unity of the party. An advanced group of it in Paris started a daily paper („Eurasia“) where the defense of the Soviet Russia came too much to the forefront. The other members living in remoter parts of Europe — they were the initiators of Eurasianism — recoiled to the starting point of the doctrine, which was principally religious and traditional, and they excommunicated the rebels (January, 1929). Since that time selfconceited fanaticism and a spirit of proselitism, which characterised the movement in the days of its youth, seem to be gone and sincere pathos to have cooled down. One does not hear much lately of Eurasianism. Its merit was, besides satisfying a passing state of feeling produced by the Russian Catastrophe, to present, under extraordinary conditions in a new light an old question which for about two centuries troubled the conscience of Russian intellectuals. In the meantime history seemed to decide it definitely. But history has its freaks; we are just passing through one of them. An appeal to the will of the coming generations is always possible. It is for the readers to decide whether it is convincing.

Ueber das Wesen der mathematischen Induktion.

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Bekanntlich versteht man unter der mathematischen Induktion ein Schlußverfahren, welches aus folgenden drei Bestandteilen gebildet wird:

1. Aus dem Beweise, daß, wenn ein Satz für n Glieder (der endlosen Reihe endlicher Zahlen) gilt, derselbe auch für $n+1$ Glieder gilt;
2. Aus der Feststellung, daß der betreffende Satz für eine bestimmte Anzahl von Gliedern (für $n=1$, oder $n=2$ etc.) gültig ist; und
3. Aus der Schlußfolgerung, daß der Satz allgemein gilt.

Worin die drei Bestandteile im einzelnen bestehen, soll an folgendem Beispiele erhellen. Der Satz, daß die Anzahl der n ersten ungeraden Zahlen $=n^2$ ist, wird durch mathematische Induktion folgendermaßen bewiesen.

Setzen wir voraus, der Satz sei gültig für n Glieder, d. h. es sei $1+3+5+\dots+(2n-1)=n^2$. Dann ist er auch für $n+1$ Glieder gültig. Denn ist $1+3+5+\dots+(2n-1)=n^2$, dann ist auch $1+3+5+\dots+(2n-1)+(2n+1)=(n+1)^2$, da $n^2+(2n+1)=n^2+2n+1=(n+1)^2$.

Nun ist $1+3=4=2^2$, der Satz ist also für $n=2$ gültig.

Ist er aber für $n=2$ gültig, dann muß er, nach dem soeben Bewiesenen, auch für $n=3$ gültig sein; wenn er aber für $n=3$ gültig ist, dann ist er auch für $n=4$ gültig u. s. f. in infinitum. Der Satz ist also allgemein gültig.

Worin besteht nun das Wesen dieses logischen Schlußverfahrens? Auf diese Frage sind im wesentlichen drei Antworten möglich.

Nach der ersten dieser drei Antworten läßt sich die mathematische Induktion auf einen einzigen hypothetischen Syllogismus zurückführen.

Nach der zweiten besteht sie aus einer unendlichen Reihe von hypothetischen Einzelsyllogismen, in denen eine und dieselbe allgemeine Praemisse als Obersatz wiederholt wird.

Nach der dritten aus einer unendlichen Reihe von aus partikulären Praemissen bestehenden hypothetischen Einzelsyllogismen.

Um den Unterschied zwischen diesen drei Interpretationen besser einsehen zu können, wollen wir denselben an dem Beispiel des Kommutationsgesetzes $a+b=b+a$ näher erläutern, welches durch mathematische Induktion folgendermaßen bewiesen wird.

Es wird zunächst der Satz $a+1=1+a$ als bewiesen und es werden die Sätze $a+b=b+a$ und $a+(b+1)=(a+b)+1$ für $b=n$ als gültig vorausgesetzt. Und es wird dann in folgender Weise bewiesen, daß $a+(n+1)=(n+1)+a$ ist.

Aus $a+n=n+a$ folgt unmittelbar, daß $(a+n)+1=(n+a)+1$ ist.

Da nun einerseits $(a+n)+1=a+(n+1)$, und andererseits $(n+a)+1=n+(a+1)=n+(1+a)=(n+1)+a$ ist, so ist $a+(n+1)=(n+1)+a$.