Freud versus Searle

pp. 151-155

in: David L. Smith, Freud's philosophy of the unconscious, Berlin, Springer, 1999

Abstract

Searle's (1992) discussion of Freud underestimates the complexity and subtlety of Freud's position.¹⁵³ Searle believes that, in contrast to his own concepts, Freud's view of the ontology of unconscious mental states is incoherent, and summarizes Freud's position as claiming that (1) unconscious mental states are occurrent rather than dispositional, (2) unconscious mental states possess a mental ontology, (3) all mental states are unconscious in themselves and (4) becoming conscious of a mental content is like perceiving an object. Searle argues that this position is inconsistent with present-day neuroscientific understanding of the brain, and that the analogy between episodes of consciousness of intentional content and episodes of perception does not make sense.