From freedom to the non-phenomenal

pp. 188-234

in: Mark T. Walker, Kant, Schopenhauer and morality, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012

Abstract

It will be recalled that Premise (II) of our proposed reconstruction, which claims in effect that that the freedom of rational agents entails their ontological universality, can be regarded as telescoping together two sub-premises, namely: II (a) What is free is non-phenomenal. II (b) What is non-phenomenal is universal. The case for II(b) will be offered in the next chapter. My objective in the present chapter is to establish II(a). More precisely, I shall argue here that free, rationalized acts are non-phenomenal in nature and in  Chapter 7 I shall argue that this entails that they are, in a certain sense to be explained more fully, universals.