Does the mirror neuron system and its impairment explain human imitation and autism?

VICTORIA Southgate

György Gergely

Gergely Csibra

pp. 331-354

in: Jaime A. Pineda (ed), Mirror neuron systems, New York City, Humana Press, 2009

Abstract

The proposal that the understanding and imitation of observed actions are made possible through the "mirror neuron system" (Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V., 2001, Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding of action. Nature Review Neuroscience, 2, 661–670) has led to much speculation that a dysfunctional mirror system may be at the root of the social deficits characteristic of autism (e.g. Ramachandran, V. S., & Oberman, L. M., 2006, Broken mirrors: A theory of autism. Scientific American, November 2006). This chapter will critically examine the hypothesis that those with ASD may be in possession of a "broken" mirror neuron system. We propose that the deficits seen in imitation in individuals with ASD reflect not a dysfunctional MNS, but a lack of sensitivity to those cues that would help them identify what to imitate. In doing this, we will also argue that imitation in typically developing children cannot be explained by appealing to a direct-matching mechanism, and that the process by which young children imitate involves a far more complex yet effortless analysis of the communication of those who they learn from.