Mental transparency, direct sensation, and the unity of the cartesian mind

Andrew Pessin

pp. 1-37

in: Jon Miller (ed), Topics in early modern philosophy of mind, Berlin, Springer, 2009

Abstract

An old question continues to rankle: Does Descartes hold that external objects are cognized only indirectly, by means of our directly cognizing some form of representative stand-in? Does he subscribe, in other words, to a "veil of perception" account of cognition?¹ The view that he does, in one form or another, has been defended by many scholars,² as has the view that he does not,³ in one form or another, with the latter generally addressing "primary" qualities. In this paper I examine the following (style of) argument, which has provided much impetus for the "veil" camp, particularly with respect to 'secondary" qualities:

Cited authors

Descartes René