On evidence

pp. 88-112

in: Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi, Meinong's theory of knowledge, Berlin, Springer, 1987

Abstract

In the following Meinong's investigation into the nature of evidence shall be discussed. Before we take a look at his theory which, as usual, is scattered throughout his works, we must be ready to expect that evidence is associated either with objects, that is, states of affairs, or objectives or with our experiences which present these objects. If evidence is present in or with objects it is absolute and objective. (In that case it would be similar to evidences which are brought forth in a court of law.) The concept of an absolute evidence is problematical, for evidence certainly has to do with the person who is confronted either with those objects or at least with the presentation of those objects. The presentation must be understood either linguistically or as experience.¹