The interaction of content and control in group problem solving and learning

Eric Bredo

pp. 113-122

in: Timothy Koschmann (ed), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice, Berlin, Springer, 2011

Abstract

The traditional theory of mind views it as a metaphysical entity (the soul). This entitative conception was revised by modern cognitive theory viewing it as a function in the head. The shift to a functional view of mind eliminates many difficulties with the entitative approach but elements of the latter persist in locating mind inside the head or brain. This creates many problems including inability to account for the collective creation of artifacts that no individual participant fully understands. Greeno attempts to deal with these issues by shifting a functional, symbol processing approach from the individual to the group level. This analysis focuses primarily on the interaction of external problem representations (knowledge) and participant status or authority (control). The resulting approach offers something new to theories of group problem-solving or learning but ignores individual learning and, in treating authority statically, does not live up to Greeno's initial goal of synthesizing cognitive and socio-linguistic theory.