Abstract
The discussion in this chapter will provide the tools for analysis of several meta-philosophical questions, including deciding what kind of principle the PDO really is and what the meaning is of such a principle being "constitutive". LIR is proposed as a way of resolving the dichotomies of cause and non-cause, determinism and indeterminism, and continuity and discontinuity. These analyses will enable a definition of the specific form of scientific-structural realism, including a metaphysics of relations, that LIR supports. A critique of current realist and anti-realist views places LIR in relation to current controversies about laws of nature. The relationship to the dialectics of Hegel is explored, to avoid the misconception that the ternary LIR system of actualization, potentialization and T-state is equivalent to Hegel's triad. The chapter closes with a brief summary of the LIR view of the domains of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind and the related issues of the naturalization of phenomenology.