Singular — general — indefinite
pp. 180-203
in: , The logic of the articles in traditional philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1974Abstract
Von Freytag's little book contains scarcely any information on the logic of logophoric terms. We therefore have no choice but to give considerable weight to his brief remarks on this topic. The reader will remember that he says: "…"der (die, das)" heisst das Element" (1961/65; cp. III-4). He is of the opinion that individuelle judgments and indefinite generic judgments have the same logical form: "the judgment… treats it [the individual, E.M.B.] like a genus-concept… Individual judgments like "Socrates is [a] man" have, then, logically the same structure as "Europeans are men" or "Sinners are men" (65f.). About the universal categorical judgment form alle S sind P he says: "As we saw, this judgment says, from a logical point of view: "S, taken as a genus or as an individual, stands in relation of identity to P"" (66; my italics).