The global politics of recognition
pp. 213-230
in: Nicholas Smith (ed), Recognition theory as social research, Berlin, Springer, 2012Abstract
Although largely absent from contemporary debates about global governance or global citizenship, the critical theory of recognition belongs from a normative point of view in the family of conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism. Only human beings, or persons, are the ultimate units of moral concern, not peoples, states, or self-contained cultures. Membership in groups, including families, voluntary associations, workgroups, neighbourhoods, and nations, is analysed in the light of the evolving needs of individuals for security, autonomy, and inclusion. None of these groups, though, has a moral standing of its own. What counts is the "I' within the "we', as Axel Honneth explains (Honneth 2010a). Furthermore recognition theory holds a special place among different conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism because it does not start from principles of justice generated by thought experiments, but from the empirical needs of human beings for recognition in the form of legal respect, social esteem, and love. These needs can give rise to struggles for recognition that always take place "within' the social framework of an "inherited cultural horizon' (Honneth 1995, p. 134).
