How where we stand constrains where i stand

applying Bratman's account of self-governance to collective action

Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko

pp. 263-277

in: Anita Konzelmann-Ziv, Hans B. Schmid (eds), Institutions, emotions, and group agents, Berlin, Springer, 2014

Abstract

Certain theories of collective action claim that collective intentions can have a direct normative power over individuals. This chapter seeks to make sense of the relationship between this and the assumed autonomy of individual agents. It is argued that a modified version of Michael Bratman's "self-governance" account of the normative force of individual intentions can be applied to collective intentions. Doing this gives a distinct way to understand the normative interplay between the individual and the collective. It changes the way we must see the universality of the normative force of collective intentions and it emphasises the importance of the individual's agentive identity being entangled with the agentive identity of the collective.

Cited authors

Bratman Michael