On objects of higher order and their relationship to internal perception
pp. 137-208
in: , Alexius Meinong, Berlin, Springer, 1978Abstract
F. Schumann, in his paper "Zur Psychologie der Zeitanschauung"1 expressed his opposition to certain basic beliefs concerning the having of ideas and cognizing (Erkennen). I have spent quite some time on the investigation into these matters and on the effort to introduce others to the investigations into the same basic matters which I have always taken as fundamental theoretical presuppositions and which have stood the test as far as I can see. Under these circumstances it may be quite useful if I explicitly express my opinions concerning the main points of Schumann's objections. I am not interested, here, in a "defense". Schumann's objective discussions bear no personal offense. And it must not influence either my or other people's judgment that a great deal of my life's work is done in vain if Schumann is right. In the same way, I do not intend to specifically prove Schumann wrong, that is, to try to show that the author's formulations are not acceptable. What is the use of pointing out merely external defects? If we really want to learn from the controversy we must clearly understand the theoretical needs from which the opposition arose. These needs must be taken into account no matter in what form they were expressed. We must, however, expect that it cannot go completely without arguments ad hominem./But, at the end, there are always merely arguments hominis at our disposal.