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Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2014

Pages: 483-497

Series: Axiomathes

Full citation:

Baptiste Le Bihan, "No-futurism and metaphysical contingentism", Axiomathes 24 (4), 2014, pp. 483-497.

No-futurism and metaphysical contingentism

Baptiste Le Bihan

pp. 483-497

in: Axiomathes 24 (4), 2014.

Abstract

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne in Australas J Philos 80(3):359–371 2002; A future for presentism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006; Braddon-Mitchell in Analysis 64(283):199–203 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 555–562, 1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?

Cited authors

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2014

Pages: 483-497

Series: Axiomathes

Full citation:

Baptiste Le Bihan, "No-futurism and metaphysical contingentism", Axiomathes 24 (4), 2014, pp. 483-497.