Conclusion

toward a new introduction to phenomenlogy

Amy E. Varela

pp. 221-228

in: William R. McKenna, Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Berlin, Springer, 1982

Abstract

In the preceeding chapters I have tried to show that there is a certain inadequacy in Husserl's "introductions to phenomenology." The four books which Husserl wrote as introductions were seen to be based on a common schema composed of three main parts.¹ The first part, entitled "the motivating problem," explains what the problem is to which transcendental phenomenology is to provide the solution, namely, the problem of cognition. The second part, "acquiring the idea of pure transcendental consciousness," contains phenomenological analyses of a pre-transcendental character as well as a general argument, based on these analyses, which attempts to show that consciousness "constitutes" the world. It is in this part that I have located the inadequacy of the "introductions." In the third part of the schema, called "the entry into the transcendental realm," certain phenomenological methods for showing how consciousness constitutes the world are explained and applied.