The critique of relativism in the prolegomena to the logical investigations

pp. 1-27

in: Gail Soffer, Husserl and the question of relativism, Berlin, Springer, 1991

Abstract

Husserl presents his first thoroughgoing critique of relativism in of the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations. This critique takes place within the broader context of the central argument of the Prolegomena, the refutation of psychologism. One line of argumentation within this refutation is: relativism is incoherent and self-refuting, psychologism is a form of relativism, therefore … In accordance with its function within this main argument, the critique addresses first and foremost relativism in the form of psychologism, i.e., the form in which what is relativized is the validity of the fundamental principles of logic; and that to which this is relativized is the psychological constitution of a given species. Yet while this particular form of relativism is the primary target of the critique, relativism in a more general form falls within its range, as Husserl himself remarks upon several occasions.