The transcendental phenomenological building-up of primordial quasi-objective space. the transcendental phenomenological "deduction" of time

pp. 230-285

in: Frederick Kersten, Phenomenological method, Berlin, Springer, 1989

Abstract

It is apparent from the course of our investigation so far that the words, "space" and "spaces," are infected with an ambiguity of almost Pickwickian proportions. Indeed, the ambiguity would seem to be unavoidable for "space" (and "time," as will be seen in later sections) in one meaning of the word, "space," can be intended to and posited without intending to and positing existent, real individual physical things. However, in another meaning of the word, "space," it cannot be intended to and posited without necessarily intending to and positing existent, real individual physical things. And these meanings of "space" have been ascertained by showing that constituting of the spatial aspect of the real, objective world includes constituting of many substrata in primary passivity which are foundations of the perception of the spatial aspect of the real, objective world. Therefore, if we understand by "space" (and "time") prespatio-temporality, and by "existent, real individual physical things" identical sensa, then we may say that "space" (and "time") can be intended to and posited without necessarily intending to and positing existent, real individual physical things because there is a clearly distinguishable substratum of space constitution "below" it ("prespace" in the narrower meaning of the term, "prespace").