James and Husserl

the horizon as a psychological and a philosophical theme

Richard Cobb-Stevens

pp. 41-54

in: Saulius Geniusas, The origins of the horizon in Husserl's phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2012

Abstract

The fundamental goal of this chapter is to answer the question, in which sense is the horizon a specifically philosophical notion and a specifically philosophical theme. With this in mind, the chapter examines how Husserl's notion of the horizon derives from James' analysis of the halo, background, and fringe of consciousness. I argue that Husserl is to be considered the founder of the horizon-problematic in philosophy, yet not because he was the first to have thematized the phenomenon of the horizon. James had already done so at a great depth. The significance of Husserl's analyses consists in having depsychologized the horizon-problematic and in having disclosed its transcendental dimensions. Thus, as a philosophical notion and a philosophical theme, the horizon is irreducibly transcendental. The single most significant philosophical upshot of such a transformation consists in eliminating arbitrariness that is entrenched in James' notion of the fringe of consciousness. Far from compromising the phenomenon's objective sense, the subject-relativity of the horizon is what allows one to identify and secure the phenomenon's objective significance.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Wundt Wilhelm

James William