Husserl's doctrine of "categorial intuition" and Heidegger's seinsfrage

pp. 245-294

in: Panos Theodorou, Husserl and Heidegger on reduction, primordiality, and the categorial, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstract

Even in the relatively recent literature on the issue of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger, some scholars recognize that despite a large number of very good accounts, the darkness surrounding the matter has not yet been totally lifted. In particular, we still lack a complete account of the exact influence that Husserl's Phenomenology exerted on Heidegger's project of a Fundamental Ontology. To use, e.g., Dahlstrom's wording, until now, the available works on this subject "merely provide points of departure for an explanation of the relation between the two phenomenologists" (Dahlstrom 2001, 142 n. 103; emphasis added).All the available textual evidence, then, makes clear that Heidegger considered the doctrine of categorial intuition, developed in the sixth LI, as the most decisive influence from Husserl on his own thought (with intentionality and the phenomenological a priori following closely). Now, what precisely is the meaning of this influence? How might that Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, namely the question of Being (Seinsfrage)?