Time, or the mediation of the now

on Dan Zahavi's "irrelational" account of self-temporalization

Matthew Coate

pp. 565-591

in: Continental Philosophy Review 51 (4), 2018.

Abstract

On Dan Zahavi's Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an "immediate impressional self-manifestation." It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi's position by going over the development of Husserl's account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. Once we reach Husserl's ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi's position is untenable.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Zahavi Dan