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Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2000

Pages: 189-206

Series: Continental Philosophy Review

Full citation:

Judith Norman, "Nietzsche contra contra", Continental Philosophy Review 33 (2), 2000, pp. 189-206.

Nietzsche contra contra

difference and opposition

Judith Norman

pp. 189-206

in: Continental Philosophy Review 33 (2), 2000.

Abstract

Nietzsche sees base morality and traditional philosophy as reactive, essentially predicated on negation and opposition. But is it possible to reject negation? To oppose oppositionality? This issue has been addressed by a variety of 20th century thinkers who think that the paradox is insurmountable. I use the thought of Deleuze to propose a way Nietzsche can respond to the accusation of paradox. Specifically, I believe Nietzsche proposes a set of philosophical terms that allow him to refer the question of opposition to a critical analysis of types of wills. Nietzsche attempts to show us a will that does not negate and oppose, but is rather affirmative. Its affirmation will be creative, rather than recognizing and reacting to an antecedent state of affairs or set of values. The purpose of this paper is to argue for the coherence and novelty of this conception of affirmative, noble will.

Cited authors

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 2000

Pages: 189-206

Series: Continental Philosophy Review

Full citation:

Judith Norman, "Nietzsche contra contra", Continental Philosophy Review 33 (2), 2000, pp. 189-206.