哲学杂志철학 학술지哲学のジャーナルEast Asian
Journal of
Philosophy

Home > Journal > Journal Issue > Journal article

Publication details

Year: 2024

Pages: 211-232

Series: East Asian Journal of Philosophy

Full citation:

Jason K. Day, "Two Paths", East Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1), 2024, pp. 211-232.

Abstract

In “On the Teachings of Gotama Buddha” (1925) and “Socrates-Buddha” (1926), Edmund Husserl claims that the Buddha achieves a transcendental view of consciousness by performing the epoché. Yet, states Husserl, the Buddha fails to develop a purely theoretical and universal science of consciousness, i.e., phenomenology, because his purely practical goal of Nibbāna limits knowledge of consciousness. I evaluate Husserl’s claims by examining the Buddha’s Majjhima Nikāya. I argue that Husserl correctly identifies an epoché and transcendental viewpoint in the Buddha’s teachings. However, I contend that Husserl’s distinction between pure theory and pure praxis leads him to misconstrue the function of the Buddha’s epoché, the extent of knowledge that the Buddha gains from the transcendental viewpoint, and the nature of Nibbāna. I finally suggest that the Buddha presents a way of studying consciousness that is a way of life, meaning that any distinction between pure theory and pure praxis is dissolved.

Publication details

Year: 2024

Pages: 211-232

Series: East Asian Journal of Philosophy

Full citation:

Jason K. Day, "Two Paths", East Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1), 2024, pp. 211-232.