The Necessary Uniformity of Nature

Michael Slote

Miami University

pp. 101-117

in: Inaugural issue, East Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1), 2021.

Abstract

In this essay, I shall defend the uniformity of nature in a new way, and that defense, in turn, will require us first to consider some a priori/conceptual ideas about what is psychologically impossible. Those ideas depend on an insight one can find in G. E. M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe’s famous book Intention. But I will attempt to generalize that insight and show how it allows us to justify a wide range of conclusions about what is, on conceptual grounds, impossible for the mind or xin. Then I will argue that there are parallel conceptual impossibilities in nature outside the mind or xin, and that discussion will ultimately lead to the conclusion that nature both inside and outside the mind has to be uniform.

Cited authors

Anscombe Elizabeth